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STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL

Was there evidence properly before the trier of fact below to sustain a finding that
the subject deeds were materially altered, following their execution, under a standard of
clear and convincing evidence?

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

This is an appeal from judgment entered by Judge Park on April 6,1988 in an
action for the equitable reformation of various deeds. The court held that the Provo
Property Warranty Deed (exhibit 11 below, Appendix "A" attached hereto and hereinafter
referred to as the "Provo Deed") remained in Emma Scott at the time of her death. The
attempt to create a co-tenancy by adding the names Velma S. Foote, Lucile S. Dalley, June
Scott, Verlon Scott and Norma S. Smith as joint tenants with fiill rights of survivorship
was held a nullity with no legal effect. The court below based this holding upon a showing
of clear and convincing evidence. The central allegation of the plaintiffs below was that the
Provo Deed had been materially altered following its execution but prior to its recording
and therefore was neither legally sound nor did it reflect the intentions of the grantors.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

This case, involving the equitable refomiaton of a deed under the evidenciary
standary of clear and convincing proof, should be reviewed under the standards restated in
Pagano v. Walker. 539 P.2d 452 (Utah 1975) The Pagano court held that "due to the
advantaged position of the trial court we will review its findings and judgments with
considerable indulgence, and will not disagree with and upset them unless the evidence
clearly preponderates against them, or the court has mistaken or misapplied the law
applicable." (Pagano at 454)

STATEMENT OF FACTS

Because this appeal concerns only the property covered by the Provo Deed, the
respondents will not burden this court with a discussion of the other deeds which were
involved below except as they affect the Provo Deed. The Provo Deed represents the
transfer of property previously represented in two deeds (exhibits 3 & 8) and a third piece
which had not been previously conveyed by the subject deeds below.
In order to appreciate the fact sof this case, this court should understand that the
parties proudly come from prioneer stock and their rural Utah background reflects the
values of that heritage. For example, Verlon Scott, as only son, received a larger portion
of land located in Utah County in order to continue his farming activities. (T. 6-7) The
pioneer and rural agrarian background of these folks provides a backdrop against which the
testimony of the parties may be placed. When we come to the testimony of Velma Foote
concerning her mother's reasons for maintaining sole ownership of the property
represented by the Provo Deed, we shall see how these considerations could assist the
court below in weighing the relative merits of the testimony and other evidence presented.
Finally, because the bulk of this appeal involves a marshalling of the facts and
arguing that they supported the findings of the court below, the respondents will forego
further detail in their statement of facts as such, and present further factual information in
the form of argument.

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

The appellant's brief fails to assist this court in several respects. First of all, it fails
to supply the Court with the appropriate standard of review, which is that the findings of
the court below will not be disturbed absent a showing that this court will review those
findings with considerable indulgence due to the advantaged position of the trial court and
will not disturb those findings unless the evidence clearly preponderates against them, or
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the court has mistaken or misapplied the law applicable thereto. Since the appellant has not
argued that the trial court misapplied law, the only contentions raised by the appellant
involve issues of fact and evidence. Accordingly, unless the appellant meets the significant
burden of demonstrating that the evidence presented clearly prepoderates against the
findings below, the judgment must stand.
The appellant, instead of addressing whether or not the evidence presented
prepoderates against the judgment and findings, merely argues that it was not sufficient to
support the findings of the court. The appellant simply attempts to attack the credibility of
the evidence presented, but makes no showing of a preponderance of evidence which is
clearly against the findings. The appellant fails to meet her burdens under the appropriate
standard of review, and her appeal must fail. The appropriate standard of review will be
established in point one of this brief.
The appellant's brief endeavors to draw the attention of this Court to issues
regarding the sufficiency of evidence in support of the findings below. The appellant
criticises the findings as being unsupported. The court, in making its findings, relied upon
two sources of evidence, (1) the testimony presented at trial, and (2) the face of the
document itself. The appellant critisizes the testimony of Velma Foote as being
inconsistent, which as we shall see is unfounded.
The appellant ignores other testimony presented at trial which the court may have
relied upon in reaching the conclusion the the Provo Deed was materially altered following
its execution. The findings state that the court "having heard the evidence and reviewed the
exhibits introduced into evidence" made its findings of fact and conclusions of law. The
court did not say, "having relied exclusively upon the testimony of Velma Foote and
reviewed the exhibits introduced into evidence" the court made findings and conclusions.
Insofar as the appellant's arguments do not addiess other relevant testimony aside from that
of Velma Foote, the appellant fails to demonstrate that there was no competent and
sufficient testimony upon which its finding could be made. Nevertheless, the appellant
3

spends much time dwelling upon the credibility of the testimony of Velma Foote and the
respondents must reply to those allegations. Velma Foote testified that the Provo Deed was
in the name of her mother, Emma Scott only when the deed was executed, but that the other
names were added later. Velma Foote was in the best possible position to understand the
documents and testify as to their contents. Seven of ten deeds in question in this case were
recorded at her request, and she was a central figure in the events surrounding the
execution of the deeds. (T. 32-55) This suit was brought by three sisters, Velma Foote,
June Scott and Lucille Dalley in order to make the deeds conform to the desires of their
parents, even though they all would lose property should the case prove successful. These
concerns will occupy the second point of the respondents' brief.
The third point of the respondents' brief will address the document itself. There is
ample evidence on the face of the Provo Deed itself that alterations were made after the
execution of the document. Together with the testimony presented it amply supports the
courts findings.

POINT I
THIS APPEAL SHOULD BE DISMISSED DUE TO THE APPELLANT'S FAILURE TO MARSHALL
EVIDENCE FOR THIS COURT SUFFICIENT TO JUSTIFY THE RELIEF SOUGHT UNDER THE
APPROPRIATE STANDARD OF REVIEW

An appellant bears important duties in structuring the issues before this court. The
appellant has failed to meet one of these duties. The appellant should provide the court with
guidance as to the appropriate standard of review. The respondent will therefore undertake
that responsibility.
The present case reflects the plaintiffs' successful attempt to refonn a deed. Such
proceedings are actions in equity, hi Battistone v. American Land and Development Co.,
607 P.2d 837 (Utah 1980), the court held that "an attempt to reform a deed is a proceeding
in equity." (Battistone at 839) This court must review the transcript and record below
under the standard appropriate to cases in equity.
4

In Pagano v. Walker. 539 P.2d 452 (Utah 1975), this court stated the standard of
review appropriate for cases of equity.
[Bjecause of the verity accorded written instruments, its
effect can only be overcome by clear and convincing
evidence.
In determining whether the evidence meets this standard, in
equity cases such as this, the court may review the facts.
However, it has long been established and reiterated by this
court in numberous cases that due to the advantaged position
of the trial court we will review its findings and judgments
with considerable indulgence, and will not disagree with and
upset them unless the evidence clearly preponderates against
them, or the court has mistaken the law applicable thereto.
Pagano at 454, emphasis added. This position was restated more recently in Jensen v.
Brown. 639 P.2d 150 (Utah 1981) and Tanner v. Baadsgaard. 612 P.2d 345 (Utah 1980).
In fact, as was noted in Pagano. the cases outlining this position are quite numerous, too
numerous to be cited in a brief of restricted length.
This court then has two duties. The first is to determine if, upon examination of the
record and transcripts below, the evidence clearly preponderates against the findings of the
court. The second is to determine if the court below misapplied the law. The appellant has
raised no issue regarding the applicable law, including the standard of appellate review,or
the trial court's misapplication of the law.
When reviewing the record and evidence presented at trial, the Court should
remember that this inquiry is not one of first impression, the standard of appellate review
requires this court to give considerable defference to the priviledged position of the trial
court. Accordingly, unless the appellant marshalls all relevant evidence, as is her burden
(see Harline v. Campbell. 728 P.2d 980 (Utah 1986) at 982)) and presents argument that
demonstrates clearly that the evidence preponderated against the findings, the appeal must
fail.
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In reviewing the level of requisite proof, the court should note that the trial court
understood that the evidence presented to support plaintiffs case had to be both clear and
convincing. (T. 10) The appellant has provided numerous definitions of "clear and
convincing evidence" in her brief. One in particular proves insightful and deserving of the
attention of this court.
[F]or a matter to be clear and convincing to a particular mind
it must have reached the point where there remains no
serious or substantial doubt as to the correctness of the
conclusion. A mind which was of the opinion that it was
convinced and yet which entertained, not a slight, but a
reasonable doubt as to the correctness of its conclusion,
would seem to be in a state of confusion.
Appellant's Brief at 12, citing Greener v. Greener, 212 P.2d 194 (Utah 1949). In order
for an appellate court to adequately assess the weight of the facts based solely upon a dead
record or transcript, it needs to search for whether or not the record addresses the weight
assigned to a particular fact by the trier of fact. In this case, the appellant wishes to
convince this court that the trier of fact did not, and could not, find the evidence supporting
its findings clear and convincing.
There is no evidence indicating a reasonable doubt in the mind of the trial court
regarding the fact that the evidence supporting the reformation of the deed was clear and
convincing. Without such an indication of a doubtful mental state of the trial judge, this
court must rely upon the representations of the attorneys regarding the weight of the
evidence below.
The positions of the parties, rather than drawing upon objective evidence and
arguing it in an organized fashion, become positions of complete subjectivity. Each
attempts to impeach the witnesses of the other anew, to demonstrate why the court
shouldn't have relied on this witness versus that witness or to draw upon irrelevant and
immaterial issues and dwell upon them. In the final analysis, these activities justify the
court's search the record for evidence of a doubtful mind. Absent such evidence, the
6

indulgences of this court require it to give way to the priviledged position of the trier of fact
below and to uphold its findings. Accordingly, the appellant's suggestion that "[t]his court
can examine the same deed and draw whatever conclusions it wishes" is incongruent with
the established standard of review in cases of equity, and should not be undertaken by this
court. (Appellant's Brief at 8)

POINT II
APPELLANT'S ALLEGATIONS CONCERNING THE RELIABILITY OF VELMA FOOTE'S
TESTIMONY ARE UNFOUNDED

The appellant has based a subatantial portion of her brief upon the notion that Velma
Foote's testimony was not credible and was inconsistent. The respondents must reply to
those allegations.
The appellant confuses the notion of disputed fact with that of inconsistent
testimony. The appellant states the "inconsistencies" complained of:
The inconsistencies are she claimed not to have seen the deed
after she gave instruction for the names to be added to it, yet
it is clear it was she who recorded it.
(Appellant's brief at 9). The first sentence of the alleged inconsistenciy quoted above states
that (1) Velma didn't see the deed after giving a list of names to Mr. Mecham to be added to
the deed, (2) that it was she who recorded the deed. There is no evidence in the record or
the transcript of the trial that Velma Foote actually recorded the Provo Deed, and indeed the
appellant cites no evidence taken from the record in support of the above quote. An
examination of the Provo Deed reveals that it was "recorded at the request of Velma S.
Foote", but the handwritten "Velma S. Foote" is not in Velma's writing and was probably
placed there by someone at the recorder's office or possibly by Mr. Mecham. Mr.
Mecham could have walked into the recorder's office and said "Velma S. Smith wants this
deed recorded" and listed "Velma S. Smith" on the deed pursuant to that request. There is
7

no evidence that Velma was actually present at the time the deed was recorded. Her
testimony that she never saw the deed after she instructed Mr. Mecham to record it is not
therefore inconsistent, and is not contradicted by other testimony.
The appellant further alleges inconsistencies:
She also claimes to have recorded or caused to be recorded
the deed, Exhibit 11, in her mother's name only. An
examination of Exhibit 11 shows she is clearly wrong.
Exhibit 11 is a certified copy of the recorded deed. If it were
recorded as Mrs. Foote testified it would show only the
name of her mother. It does not. It contains the names of
the other grantees.
(Appellant's Brief at 9-10). The appellant's complaint is of credible testimony, not of an
inconsistency; the court found Velma's testimony credible. This entire law suit revolves
around the issue of whether or not the Provo Deed was altered subsequent to its execution,
and that was based upon the document itself and credible testimony offered at trial
concerning its execution and its subsequent recording. This infers that there were "two"
Provo Deeds, (1) the deed as executed, and (2) the deed as recorded. Velma Foote's
testimony is perfectly consistent with the deed as executed, but not with the deed as
recorded. Accordingly, Velma's testimony is internally consistent. Her testimony simply
differs with the deed as recorded and the court found that testimony credible. It was given
in the successful and proper attempt to prove that the deed was materially altered following,
not only its execution, but the death of one of the grantors, namely True Scott (T. 54), and
was therefore invalid.
To further substantiate the credibility of Velma's testimony, the respondents draw
the court's attention to pages 65 through 67 of the transcript. Counsel for the Appellant
questioned and examined Velma Foote concerning the various properties owned by
member of the family as represented in the deeds involved in the trial below. Velma was
able on cross-examintation to recall which lots belonged to who and whether or not there
were homes on the lots, as this brief excerpt demonstrates:
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Q

All right Number 6?

A

6 is the Burge family.

Q

Okay

A

There is a home on it.

Q

All right put a box around Number 6?

A

Yes.

Q

All right Number 7 if you can find it, what is 7?

A
This is the property that Verlon had and that was the
end of the True Scott lot. There was a home on it.
Q

Is that just on the other side of the Burge?

A

Yes.

Q

Okay that is Number 7?

A

Yes.

Q

Have a box around there. And there is a home there?

A

Right.

(T. at 67). There is ample evidence that Velma was a reliable and credible witness. Her
knowledge of the properties in question was solid. The trial court had the opportunity to
observe her testify and found her testimony, when coupled with the documents in
evidence, credible.
The only other testimony presented at trial that was contrary to that of Velma Foote
was presented by the defendant, Norma Smith. Norma testified that she was positive that
the Provo Deed contained the names of grantees exactly as it appears on the recorded copy.
(T. 126) An examination of her testimony reveals a defective memory, which could tend to
make her testimony less credible in the eyes of the court:
The Witness: As I remember it and I don't remember what
day it was and we filled out the one deed.
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Q

Which deed?

A

I don't remember which one.

Q

Okay.

A

I have tried to but I can't remember.

(T. at 128-129). Aside from an inability to recall which dates and which documents were
in question, Norma Smith had trouble recalling other details of the deeds:
Q
Who was present [when exhibit 12 was executed and
signed]?
A

Like I said before my mother and my father Velma

and myself.
Q

No one else?

A
No one else.
Q
I would like to show you exhibit No. 12 (indicating)
and I would like you to read me the date as to when his
particular deed was signed by your parents?
A

25th day of February.

Q

Not the 16th day of February?

A

That is right.

Q

Who witnessed that particular signature?

A

Norma Smith and Velma written Velma Scott.

* * *

Q

Is that Velma Scott or is that Verlon?

A
Velma was the one that went with me when we both
had then made out.
Q

What does the signature say?

A

I thought it was Velma, V-E-L-M-A.

Q
I would just like the court at some point to take notice
of whose signature that would be.
The Court:
Well Velma at that time was known as Velma
Foote Wasn't she?
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Mr. Dunn:

Yes she was ...

(T. 131-133). This Court may examine Exhibit 12 attached to Appellant's brief and will
likewise notice that it was signed not by Velma Foote, but by Verlon Scott. Apparently he
was at the meeting in question when the document was executed and signed, calling into
doubt the recollection of Norma Smith.
Finally, the testimony of Velma Foote provides another piece of information which,
when considered in connection with the pioneer background of the parties, adds additional
creedence to her testimony and further bolsters the courts regard for her powers of
recollection and credibility. Explaining why Emma Scott's name appeared alone on the
Provo Deed, Velma testifies:
Q
So originally these properties then if I understand
your testimony so we can make sure it is clear were deeded
from your father to himself and his wife Emma Scott?
A

Yes.

Q

Okay.

A
And at the same time we did one to my mother my
dad leaving it to my mother.
Q

Solely to your mother?

A
Yes because she wanted to own some ground and
know what it felt like to own something.
(T. at 50). Given the rural and pioneer heritage of this family, a heritage in which property
was owned and pass down from father to son so long as male progenity held out, for
Emma Scott to own some ground and to understand what that felt like is significant.
Ownership of land was a badge of distinction for Emma Scott. This explains why the
intent of True and Emma Scott was to grant all of their property to their children and the
children of their deceased daughter Ira Burge, yet Emma retained sole ownership of the
property represented by the Provo Deed.
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Not only was the testimony of Velma Foote internally consistent and sound, but
there she testified to related matters that gave further credibility to her rendition of the
events surrounding the documents in question. This should be contrasted by Norma
Smith's lack of certainty and recall concerning the events surrounding the execution of the
deeds in question. The trial court correctly relied on the consistent and informed
representations of Velma Foote. The appellant has failed to demonstrate that there is
evidence which clearly presponderates against any findings made by the judge. The appeal
must therefore fail.

POINT HI
A N EXAMINATION OF THE FACE OF THE PROVO DEED ITSELF REVEALS THAT THE TRIAL
COURT CORRECTLY FOUND IT TO HAVE BEEN MATERIALLY ALTERED, WHICH
ALTERATIONS WERE VOID.

In its findings of fact, the court stated:
It is apparent on the face of the warranty deed that the
original deed was altered. The distance between the comma
after the word "wife" on the third line of the deed is closer
than the other commas. The next two lines angle upward
toward the right with the bottom of the beginning letter of the
word "Velma" being slightly below the line and the final
letter of the word "Smith" on the same line being
substantially above the line. Finally, an "S" was not added
to the word "grantee" on line six of the warranty deed.
Those facts coupled with credible testimony that the
warranty deed was altered by Arnold Mecham at the
direction of Emma Scott after the death of True Scott, led
this court to find that the original deed to the Provo property
was altered. (See warranty deed, defendant's exhibit 11.)
(Findings of Fact and Conclusios of Law at 2-3). The appellant argues that exhibit 11 was
not the only deed on which some of the lines are not parallel to the form lines on the deed.
This is true., however, the Provo Deed is the only deed on which the first line listing the
grantee (Ernma Scott) runs parallell to the lines on the form and on which the lines listing
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the other alleged grantees don't run parallell to the form. The respondents' contention is
not only that the lines on the deeds are not parallell to the form deed, but that in the case of
the Provo Deed, the typed lines are not parallell to each other. This is clear evidence that
the subsequent lines were not typed at the same time as the first line listsing "Emma Scott,
his wife", that the deed was placed in a typrewritter a second time, and the additional names
typed onto the form.
The appellant raises a subsequent objection to the findings of the court regarding the
deed itself, arguing that because the court used a photocopy of the Provo Deed, it could not
extract clear and convincing evidence of irregularities from the document itself. With
reference to the comma appearing after the words "his wife", the top of the comma nearly
touched the "e" at the end of the word "wife". Upon examination of the position of the
commas found elsewhere on that document one readily concludes that it is much closer to
the letter "e" in wife than it is to the final letter "e" on the next line in "Velma Foote". It is
much closer than the letter "t" on the same line after the words "Emma Scott". Typewriters
such as the one employed obviously did not employ techniques of kerning in their type
style. That is, the type fonts are monospaced, with each letter or character (in this case a
punctuation mark) occupying an equal amount of space on the line. One can use the word
processing techniques used today, but unavailable in 1970, to demonstrate how this affects
the court's proper relioance on the position of the comma as clear and convincing evidence
of alteration.
This line is monospaced. Note the
uniform space occupied by the letters ,fi"
and "s" in the word "This", and the
letters "o", "t" and "e" in the word
"Note". Punctuation sample: r .; : " f
This line is kerned. Notice how the letters "o" and "c"
in the word "Notice" are about 1/16 of an inch wide,
while the letter "i" in the same word in about 1 /64th of
an inch wide. Typewritters of the very early 1970s
didn't employ this kind of kerning. Punctuation
sample: ,.;:"'
13

The amount of space between the comma following "his wife" is much smaller than it
should be if the names of the grantees under the deed had in fact been typed at the time of
execution. This proves quite convincing in establishing a clear and obvious alteration
made after the execution of the deed, hi fact, it is an insightful and intelligent conclusion
made by Judge Park. The document does, in fact, contain ample evidence of alteration,
and it is both clear and convincing in light of the technologies of the times. Accordingly,
the appeal must fail.

CONCLUSIONS

The appellant, under the appropriate standard of appellante review, has failed to
demonstrate that the evidence presented at trial clearly preponderated against the findings of
the court. In an effort perhaps intended to do so, the appellant hs merely argued that the
testimony of Velma Foote was not credible and that the face of the document did not reveal
clear and convincing evidence that the deed had been altered. The appellant would have
this court substitute its judgment for that of the trial bench based upon these thin
arguments. The respondents have not only demonstrated a sufficiency of clear and
convincing evidence but have established the decisiveness of that evidence and that the
court had no choice but to recognize the obvious alteratios present. To have decided
otherwise at trial would have resulted in findings clearly against the weight of the evidence
and in violation of applicable law. This court, in recognizing the advantaged position of the
trial court in this matter should establish the propriety of the trial court's activities by
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dismissing this appeal, together with costs and other remedies this court sees fit, within the
bounds of justice and equity.

DATED this //T

Aday of April, 1989.

MARK DALTON DUNN
DUNN & DUNN
ATTORNEYS FOR RESPONDENTS
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APPENDIX "A"
THE PROVO DEED
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^ Coodeneing 16.72 chains v e s t and 0.25 chain south o f the Jlortheoat
corner of the Korthvest quarter of Section 1 4 , Vownahip 7 smith,
Kange 2 o a s t of the S a l t L*i:e Banc and Kerldlan;
thence south 1 dag. v c » t 33»20 chains;
thence south 52 rieg. v e s t 2.28 chains;
thonca north 40 d e g . v e s t 4 . 9 5 ciiaina;
thence north 1 a e g . e a s t 31 chain*;
thence e a s t 3 . I S chains;
thance south 0,25 c W . n ;
thence e a s t 1.77 cliai.10 to beginning*
A-ea 16.20 a c r e s , rore o r l e s s .
Together vdth a r i ^ h t of vay described as f o l l o v a t
Ccct;aicin£ 1 1 . i 0 chains v e s t of the Northeast corner of tho *«orthvest
charter of Section 1 4 , Township 7 south, Jtange 2 e a s t , S.L.3.& X . ;
li.tr.ee south 1 dog. v e s t 2V.3G chains;
thence south 52 deg. v e s t C.32 chain;
thence north 1 Cef,. e a s t 29.25 chains;
thence w.*t 6.74 Grains;
thence north 0 . 2 5 chain;
thence east 6.99 chains t o beginning*
' Ccocencing 21.67 enaina vent of the Northeast c o m e r of the h o r t h v e s t quarter of Section 1 4 , Tcvnship 7 s c u t h , Harare 2 eAst, S.L.B.& K.;
thcr.ce ve*t 3*02 c h a i n s |
thence south J. deg. v e s t 26.13 chains;
thence south 40 deg. e a s t 4 . 5 1 chains;
thence north 1 deg. e a s t 29*19 chain*
to the place o f beginning.
Together with a c c r e t i o n land l y i n g south of tho
above describwd lands*

r
Cortnencing in the West boundary of 1600 WesC S t r e e t , Provo, Utah at
a point ScuCh along t h o i S c c t i o n l i n e 850.79 feee *nd Vesc 745.43 f e e t
from Che North quarter corner of Section 1 1 , Tovnship 7. South, Ran^eJJ
E««t, Sale Lake Base and Meridian; the.net South 0*49*2(Tf Vest along s a i d
s t r e e t boundary 385.16 £?ct to a fence corners thence Korth 89*19*50 M Wont
! a lonn so id fence l i n e 1307.60 f e e t ; thenct Korth l*07'20" East alonf. the
fc-^cr l i n e 390.48 f c e e ; thenco South 89*30 , 20 , f East along the fence t i n e
•'246.27 f e e t ; thence North 1*07*10^ Ease along Che fence l l n b .475.29 f e e t ;
1 thence South 89*29* EnsC along the fence l i n e 769.97 f e e t ; thence South
0*49*20" Vest p a r a l l e l with s a i d s t r e e t boundary 482.69 f e e t ; thence S o u t h .
89*10*40" Ea»c 286.86 feat to s a i d s t r e e t boundary;and the point of beg?
inning. Area.* 20.13 c c r e i u
*
'"..*"•.••••... *?'& >'
i'

•Z\

ru™^

Ccmenclng In the West boundary of 1600 Vest "street ~ P ™ ™ ~ T > . U

. l 5

!

L M ^ S . ? i ! i £ ^ 1 ; ' ^ « « r l d l a n , t h e n c . South

Jnrcthcr vlth a l l v a t e r r i g h t s . " :';
'—~—-——^:-=:To-ether %dth any undiscovered p r o p e r t r , '

ohviO*

—

40^1173 J1K&21
WITNESS THE HANDU. of said G n a t o p - tM»

E s i — , A. a in ?n '.
Signed la tKo pt i winro of

'T/i/^c^

4- ^rv<*£e+

On tL«_

2-*])
16th

I —& frr\or? fa $t *PW~L

h:

STATS OP UTA*
Couatj of

^^4^4-

ii7«L

Feb.

_, A. D. 19 "TO , perso&aUx app«sxod

Wore mo, a NoUrj PuhEc la cad for i£* Siato o£ UUk,
• • *»

A'.'"'',•

Trsc S c o t t and £rr:& S c o t t , M s wlr »*

• % u c ilgaer-i-.&(.-&• tbor* IcsLnimeat, trLo duly oekzuerwled^cd to mo &afc

h

*•*• * >

lO/

ho ,. execated tht MIS*.

Notary PubUe

'My coszaii*ia» erpires.
MAIL TAX NOTICE TO

y&iis-iSs
Ukr «
s

f

M.

iKaiif'tS «u4i.t)
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?i^«

WARRANTY DEED

: z »*4
7-"u* Si.rT«j, and Enc* Scnvtt, hi* vi p i

:-^oo-n"" 2*
IUF*

^J

Frovo, Utah Cotmty, Utah
Errn

>bj CONVEY— AND WARRANT— to

Scnt.t, I la KJ ;>,

a

n

tins .3. Frxptf, TjiMTit S, toUry, JfflC Sctttt, Tcrlffil ?C U WJ W^TT* Smith,
t« W * t . t m e a t s , v i t h f u l l rirhta of ^urrivorahlp
_
_ _
_
Ai

^rovo, Utah County, Utah
Otf

tne suzn oL . , _

.,..
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following described triict <rf l»n#? Jfi
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I «Hi

• • ._._——^LLAJI,
If* K -

, ._.-JLi3iL——.

O^iii'r

• of TTtnTi. fo-wff'i

i

t.

Ccocendng 16,72 chains v e s t and 0.25 chain south of the JJortheflat
comer of the Northwest quarter of S e c t i o n 1 4 , Vownship 7 south.
hange 2 east of tli« S a l t Lake Ba»o and Xeridianj
thence south I dag. wc»t 33*20 c h a i n s |
thence south 52 rieg. v e s t 2 . 2 8 chains}
thence north LO deg. v e s t U.95 ciiaina;
thence north 1 cleg, 'east 31 chains;
thence east 3 . I S chains;
thence south 0,25 c}*a5.n;
thence east 1.7? diaLia to fceginniiw;, ,
A^ea 16.20 a c r e s , r.ore or l e s s .
Together vdth a r i g h t of vay d e s c r i b e as follow?:
Coc^ncing, 11.50 chains v e s t of the Worthoast comer of the I-orthvest
quarter of Section H» Township 7 south, liaise 2 ea< • , p.fcL,a(ft M,«
U.ence south 1 clcg# vast 2V.3C chains;
thence south 52 deg. v e s t C.32 chain;
thence north 1 dcf,. e a s t 2V.25 chains;
thence v*\at 6,74 chainsf
thence north 0.25 chain;
thence east 6„99 chains t c: II ep! :rii ng # •
Cccceneing 21.6? cnains v e i t of tho Northeast comer of the horthv c S t quarter of Section 2L, Tcvnship 7 south, P^n 2 e a s t , S.I 2 ft II,;
tnence ve?t 3*02 chains;
*
tnence south .1 deg # west 26.13 chains;
thence south LO deg. e a s t L.51 chains;
thence north 1 deg. east 29.19 chains
to * k - pla-f - f beflnninc #
Together with accretion land l y i n g south of tHa
a1,-!/!! describ 4 1 t\n** ,
Cofflmcncinj; in i us West bounitry ot iouu West S t r e e t , imvu,
iic
Irt South alone thciSoction l i n e 850*79 f e e t snd We*t 745.43 ftuw
the North quarter corner of S e c t i o n l l f Tovnshlp 7. South, Ran(je 2
l
f
f Salt Lake Base and Meridian; thence South Q*49 2CT West along s a i d
rt boundary 385.'16 f?et to a fence corner; thence Korth 8 9 • l 9 , 5 0 , , Went
r: said fen-.:- !*
^.TMM f»#tl rhenca Korth 1*07«20" &:•*» a!.™.-* M,I

